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Abstract
For exposures X like obesity, no precise and unambiguous defini-
tion exists for the hypothetical intervention do(X = x0). This has
raised concerns about the relevance of causal effects estimated from
observational studies for such exposures. Under the framework of
structural causal models, we study how the effect of do(X = x0) re-
lates to the effect of interventions on causes of X. We show that for
interventions focusing on causes of X that affect the outcome through
X only, the effect of do(X = x0) equals the effect of the considered
intervention. On the other hand, for interventions on causes W of X
that affect the outcome not only through X, we show that the effect
of do(X = x0) only partly captures the effect of the intervention. In
particular, under simple causal models (e.g., linear models with no
interaction), the effect of do(X = x0) can be seen as an indirect effect
of the intervention on W .
1
1 Introduction
Because most epidemiological results are derived from observational data,
their causal interpretation has always been at the center of concern1. Causal
inference theory, which has attracted a lot of interest in the last few decades,
has proved useful to formally describe conditions ensuring the causal validity
of results derived from observational data2,3,4,5,6,7. For example, a number
of sets of sufficient conditions has been established for the identifiability
of causal effects in the presence of confounding or non-random selection.
Under the so-called Structural Causal Models3,6 (SCMs), and further as-
suming that the structure of the underlying Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
is known, a key condition for the identifiability of the causal effect is ex-
changeability, or ignorability3,6,7. In particular, exchangeability has been
shown to hold conditionally on any set of variables satisfying the back-door
criterion3,6. Then, a variety of statistical approaches have been proposed for
the estimation of causal effects under increasingly complex settings including
time-varying confounding, failure time data, etc. Among other approaches,
we shall mention the parametric g-formula, inverse probability weighting
approaches, g-estimation and doubly robust procedures3,7,8.
Even if their use has been controversial9, counterfactual variables, or
potential outcomes, are key to most causal inference theories commonly
considered nowadays, in epidemiology, social science, statistics and com-
puter science. The do-calculus that accompanies SCMs allows precise def-
initions of these variables and their joint distribution3,6. Here, we will
use the notation Y (X=x0) to denote the counterfactual variable represent-
ing the outcome that would have been observed in the counterfactual world
Ω(X=x0) that would have followed the hypothetical intervention do(X = x0),
where X is the exposure of interest and x0 is any potential value for this
exposure3. For simplicity, we will focus on binary outcomes, and we let
IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0) = 1) = IP(Y (X=x0) = 1) denote the probability of
observing the outcome in this counterfactual world.
For some exposures, the lack of a precise and unambiguous definition
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for the intervention do(X = x0) has raised some concerns in the litera-
ture10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19. For example, consider the case where X stands
for a binary variable indicating obesity status at 20 years of age. In a pop-
ulation of lean teenagers, or even newborns, the hypothetical intervention
do(X = x0), for x0 = 0 (or x0 = 1), could then correspond to a typi-
cally adaptive and dynamic intervention that would ensure that individuals
stay lean (or get obese) by the age of 20. However, these interventions
are not well-defined, in the sense that different “versions” may lead to the
same obesity value x0 at 20 years-old. For instance, in the “stay lean” arm
(do(X = 0)), individuals may be asked to do 45 minutes of physical exercise
a day, or 72 minutes of physical exercise a day. They could also be asked
to adhere to a healthy diet, etc. In addition, some of the versions ensuring
that X = 0 at 20 years old may be impossible to apply in practice, such as
those involving genetic factors.
More generally, this situation of a treatment with different versions,
or compound treatment, violates the “no-multiple-versions-of-treatment as-
sumption”, which is part of the “Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption”
(SUTVA)16,20. This has led to some debate around the relevance, for public
health matters, of the causal effects estimated from observational studies in
such cases. Interestingly, most arguments have been based by considering
the situation where “treatment precedes versions of that treatment”, while
situations where “versions precede treatment” were only quickly mentioned,
if at all11,12,16. Here, we consider the situations where versions precede
treatment, in which case these versions can be seen as particular levels for
the causes of X . Then, focusing on situations where direct interventions on
X are impractical, we inspect how the effect of the hypothetical intervention
do(X = x0) relates to the effects of interventions on causes of X . We show
that the effect of the hypothetical intervention do(X = x0) equals the effect
of particular interventions on causes of X that are causes of Y through X
only, as expected. However, for causes W that influence Y not only through
X , the causal effect of X differs from the causal effect of interventions on
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W . For example, in the particular case of obesity and cancer occurence,
the effect of do(X = x0) is different from the effects of interventions on diet
or physical activity, except for cancers whose risk is not directly associated
with diet and/or physical activity.
To make our illustrative example even more concrete, we assume through-
out that we intend to estimate the causal effect of obesity at 20 years of age
on the occurence of cancer by the age of 50. A typical prospective co-
hort study would sample individuals who are cancer-free at the age of 20,
record information regarding their obesity status and other variables (po-
tential confounders, etc.) at inclusion, follow these individuals over the age
interval 20-50 and finally record cancer occurence by the age of 50. Denote
by X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ {0, 1} the binary variables representing obesity at 20
and cancer occurence between 20 and 50. For simplicity, we further assume
the absence of competing events and censoring.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Even if this is highly un-
likely in our illustrative example, we start by considering the unconfounded
setting where all causes of X are causes of Y through X only. Then, in Sec-
tion 3, we consider a more realistic setting where confounders are present.
We shall stress that this second setting is still an over-simplified version of
the causal model in our illustrative example (see the Discussion). Yet, we
believe it is instructive to describe the relationship between the intervention
do(X = x0) and its multiple versions. Under both settings, we consider the
situation where some causes are modifiable, while others are not. Section 4
presents some concluding remarks and discussion. Proofs of our main results
are presented in the Appendix.
2 The unconfounded case
Because exposure X is not randomized in our prospective cohort study,
identifiability of the causal effect of X on Y is generally not guaranteed. A
particular situation when this causal effect is identifiable is when all causes of
X , denoted by U in this simple case, are causes of Y through X only. Even
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X Y
ξ
U
{
X = fX(U)
Y = fY (X, ξ)
(a) Standard causal model, without
confounding
X Y
ξ
V
ϑ
{
X = fX(V, ϑ)
Y = fY (X, ξ)
(b) Decomposing U as U = (V, ϑ),
where V and ϑ correspond to mod-
ifiable and non-modifiable causes of
X, respectively
Figure 1: DAGs and associated structural equations in the unconfounded
case. Non-circled variables (U , ξ, ϑ and V ) correspond to exogeneous vari-
ables6, which are generally not reported in the DAG. We use dashed-arrows
to connect any such exogeneous variable to any other variable.
if this absence of confounders is highly unlikely in our illustrative example,
it is instructive to consider this simple situation as a starting point. The
more general situation where confounding is present is deferred to Section 3.
2.1 Preliminary derivations
Consider that the data available in our cohort study are generated by a causal
model with associated DAG and structural equations as presented in Figure
1a. Variables ξ and U represent all causes of Y and X , respectively, and are
assumed to be independent to each other. Both ξ and U may include purely
random components. Given the structural equations attached to this simple
causal model, we have {X = x} ⇒ {Y = Y (x)}, so that consistency holds.
Moreover, under this causal model, the ignorability condition Y (x)⊥X holds.
Then, whenever the positivity condition further holds (0 < IP(X = 1) < 1),
we have
ACE = IP(Y = 1|do(X = 1))− IP(Y = 1|do(X = 0))
= IP(Y = 1|X = 1)− IP(Y = 1|X = 0),
and the causal effect ofX on Y is identifiable. But, when direct interventions
onX are impractical, and only interventions on the causes ofX are practical,
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a natural question is the meaning of the hypothetical intervention do(X = x).
Consider the structural equation pertaining to exposure,X = fX(U), and set
f−1X (x0) = {u : fX(u) = x0}. Of course, we have X = x0 ⇔ U ∈ f
−1
X (x0).
As a result, for any ux0 ∈ f
−1
X (x0), IP(Y = 1|do(U = ux0)) = IP(Y =
1|do(X = x0)); see Appendix A. In this simple case, all interventions do(U =
ux0) on the causes of X which would yield X = x0 share the same effect on
Y : versions are irrelevant11,16, and the causal effect IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0))
estimated on the cohort is an estimate of this shared effect.
2.2 Distinguishing modifiable and non-modifiable
causes
To gain insight from a practical standpoint, the previous analysis can be
slightly refined by decomposing causes of X as U = (V, ϑ) where V and ϑ
correspond to sets of modifiable and non-modifiable causes ofX , respectively.
See Figure 1b. Because non-modifiable causes may affect modifiable ones,
while the former are unlikely to be affected by the latter, we do not consider
the possibility of an arrow pointing from V to ϑ in Figure 1b. Causes ϑ
are non-modifiable and the only interventions that could be practically set
up are those on V . Denote the set of possible values of ϑ by V . Then,
for any x ∈ {0, 1} and ν ∈ V , set f−1
X|ϑ(x; ν) = {v : fX(v, ν) = x}. First
assume that this set is non-empty for any x ∈ {0, 1} and ν ∈ V : in other
words, first assume that, for any x ∈ {0, 1}, and for any value ν for the
non-modifiable factors ϑ, there exists some value v of the modifiable factors
V such that fX(ν, v) = x. Now, for individuals such that ϑ = ν0, for any
ν0 ∈ V , we have X = x0 ⇔ V ∈ f
−1
X|ϑ(x0; ν0). Therefore IP(Y
(V=vx0 (ν0)) =
1|ϑ = ν0) = IP(Y = 1|do(V = vx0(ν0)), ϑ = ν0) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0))
for any vx0(ν0) ∈ f
−1
X|ϑ(x0; ν0). Denote by do(V = vx0(ϑ)) any intervention
which sets, for all individuals in the population, the value of V according
to the value ν0 of ϑ, in such a way that for any individual with ϑ = ν0,
the intervention do(V = vx0(ϑ)) sets V to vx0(ν0) ∈ f
−1
X|ϑ(x0; ν0). Then, we
have IP(Y = 1|do(V = vx0(ϑ))) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0)). In other words,
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versions are again irrelevant and any such intervention has the same effect
on Y , which is IP(Y = 1|do(V = vx0(ϑ)) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0)).
Of course, unless there exists at least one value v1 ∈ ∩ν∈V{f
−1
X|ϑ(x0; ν)},
only a dynamic, i.e. individual-specific, treatment can be adopted to attain
this effect. For instance, consider the “stay lean” arm of the clinical trial
mentioned in the Introduction. Because individuals may be more or less
genetically predisposed to obesity, some individuals will have to make little
effort to stay lean by the age of 20, while others will have to adopt a dras-
tic diet and/or have intense physical activity, etc. We may stress that this
heterogeneity among individuals is at the core of personalized (preventive)
medicine and need to be acknowledged, rather than discarded, in causal in-
ference. Similarly, our cohort reflects this heterogeneity: individuals sharing
the same obesity status {X = x0}, for x0 ∈ {0, 1}, can differ regarding V and
ϑ. More precisely, for x0 ∈ {0, 1}, set V(x0) = {ν ∈ V : f
−1
X|ϑ(x0; ν) 6= ∅}.
The lean and obese groups in our cohort are sampled from
{X = x0} =
⋃
ν∈V(x0)
{
{ϑ = ν}
⋂
{V ∈ f−1
X|ϑ(x0; ν)}
}
for x0 = 0 and x0 = 1, respectively. Again, if the model of Figure 1b is
correct, versions of the compound treatment obesity are not relevant11,16.
Therefore, how the levels of the causes of “obesity at 20 years of age” are
mixed up in the group of obese, or lean, individuals in our cohort is not
relevant either: our cohort would return unbiased estimates for the quantity
IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0)) = IP(Y = 1|X = x0), just as the clinical trial would.
Then, the effect of the intervention do(X = x0) can again be interpreted as
the effect of any intervention on the causes of X ensuring X = x0.
If, for some x, there exist some values ν1 ∈ V of the non-modifiable
variables ϑ such that the set f−1
X|ϑ(x; ν1) is empty, the intervention do(X = x)
is purely theoretical for individuals such that ϑ = ν1 since no practical
intervention could yield X = x for them. However, under the assumptions
of SCMs, and if the DAG of Figure 1b is correct, the effect of the hypothetical
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intervention do(X = x0) can still be estimated from our cohort study even if
no practical intervention ensuring X = x0 exists for individuals with ϑ = ν1.
Indeed, we have IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0), ϑ = ν1) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0) =
IP(Y = 1|X = x0).
3 The more standard case with confounders
3.1 Preliminary analyses
We now turn our attention to the more common situation where confounding
is present. Without loss of generality, assume that causes of X are grouped
in two sets, W and U . Here, and as above, causes in U are assumed to
have an effect on Y through X only, while W is the set of common causes
of X and Y , that is the set of confounders in the X-Y relationship. In our
illustrative example, W could include gender, physical activity and dietary
habit, while U might include genetic predisposition to obesity. Figure 2a
depicts the corresponding causal model. Assume for ease of notation that
the setW of possible values forW is discrete. Further recall that consistency
still holds, and assume that 0 < IP(X = 1|W = w) < 1 for all w such that
IP(W = w) > 0. Then, because Y (x) ⊥ X |W under the model depicted in
Figure 2a , the causal effect of X on Y is identifiable. More precisely, we
have
ACE =
∑
w
[IP(Y = 1|X = 1,W = w) − IP(Y = 1|X = 0,W = w)]IP(W = w).
But, again, a natural question is how the hypothetical intervention do(X =
x) does relate to interventions on causes of X . Neglecting for now issues
related to the possibility to apply these interventions in practice, these in-
terventions can concern either (i) U only, (ii) W only, or (iii) both U and
W .
First consider interventions on U only and set, for any x ∈ {0, 1} and
w ∈ W , f−1
X|W (x;w) = {u : fX(u,w) = x}. For any w0 ∈ W , we have X =
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X Y
W ξ
U
{
X = fX(U,W )
Y = fY (X,W, ξ)
(a) Standard causal model with con-
founding
X Y
W Z ξ
V
ϑ
{
X = fX(V, ϑ,W,Z)
Y = fY (X,W,Z, ξ)
(b) Distinguishing modifiable and non-
modifiable causes of X in the presence of
confounding
Figure 2: Causal models in the presence of confounders.
x0 ⇔ U ∈ f
−1
X|W (x0;w0) for individuals belonging to stratumW = w0. Then,
assume that f−1
X|W (x0;w0) is non-empty for all (x0, w0) ∈ {0, 1} × W and
denote by do(U = ux0(W )) any intervention setting U to any value ux0(w0) ∈
f−1
X|W (x0;w0) for individuals in stratumW = w0, for all w0 ∈ W . Arguing as
in Section 2.2, we get IP(Y = 1|do(U = ux0(W ))) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0));
see Section B.1 in the Appendix. Again, versions are irrelevant, and any
such intervention has the same effect on Y , which is IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0)).
Now consider interventions on W only and set, for any x ∈ {0, 1} and
u ∈ U , f−1
X|U (x;u) = {w : fX(u,w) = x}. Then, assume that f
−1
X|U(x;u)
is non-empty for every (x, u) ∈ {0, 1} × U , and for any u0 ∈ U , de-
note by wx0(u0) one given element of f
−1
X|U (x0;u0). Given this particu-
lar collection of values (wx0(u))u∈U , denote by do(W = wx0(U)) the in-
tervention which sets W to wx0(u0) for individuals in stratum U = u0,
for all u0 ∈ U . Arguing as before, it comes that IP(Y = 1|do(W =
wx0(U))) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0,W = wx0(U))), which generally differs
from IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0)). The intervention do(W = wx0(U)) does en-
tail X = x0 for all individuals, but because W has an effect on Y not
only through X , the effect of do(W = wx0(U)) is not entirely captured
by that of do(X = x0). Actually, X can be seen as a mediator in the
W − Y relationship, and, under simple models, in particular in the absence
of interaction between X and W , the effect of do(X = x0) is actually re-
lated to the indirect effect of the intervention do(W = wx0(U)), through
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X ; see Section B.3 in the Appendix. It is also important to note that
IP(Y = 1|do(W = wx0(U)) depends on the collection of values (wx0(u))u∈U .
If w0 and w˜0 are two distinct elements of f
−1
X|U (x0;u0) for some u0 ∈ U ,
then IP(Y = 1|do(W = w0), U = u0) = IP(Y (W=w0,X=x0) = 1), while
IP(Y = 1|do(W = w˜0), U = u0) = IP(Y (W=w˜0,X=x0) = 1). The difference
between these two quantities is related to the direct effect of W , and reflects
the fact that two interventions on W sharing the same effect on X do not
necessarily have the same effects on Y when W has a direct effect on Y : in
this case, versions of the compound treatment are relevant.
Now, if f−1
X|U (x;u) is empty for some (x, u) ∈ {0, 1}×U , then no interven-
tion onW only can ensureX = x for individuals in stratum U = u. Similarly,
if f−1
X|W (x;w) is empty for some pair (x,w), then no intervention on U only
can ensure X = x for individuals in stratum W = w. Then, consider inter-
ventions on both W and U , and set f−1X (x) = {(w, u) : fX(u,w) = x}. For
any (w0, u0) ∈ f
−1
X (x0), it is easy to show that IP(Y = 1|do(W = w0, U =
u0)) = IP(Y
(W=w0,X=x0) = 1). Therefore, interventions on both W and U
that ensure X = x0 are similar to interventions on W only: their effects are
generally not uniquely defined (they depend on the particular pair of values
(w0, u0) ∈ f
−1
X (x0)) and only partly capture the effect of interventions on
X .
3.2 Distinguishing modifiable and non-modifiables
causes
All the analyses above can be refined by acknowledging that some causes
in U and W are modifiable, while others are not, and by considering inter-
ventions on modifiable causes only. See Figure 2b. Compared to Section
3.1, notations become a little more complex, but conclusions remain mostly
similar. For instance, consider interventions on both V and W , where V
is a modifiable cause of X with no direct effect on Y , while W is a modi-
fiable confounder in the X − Y relationship. For any x0 ∈ {0, 1} and any
potential values ν and z for non-modifiable causes ϑ and Z, assume that the
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set f−1
X|ϑ,Z(x0; ν, z) = {(v, w) : fX(v, ν, w, z) = x0} is non-empty, and de-
note by (vx0(ν, z), wx0(ν, z)) one given element in this set. Then denote by
do(V = vx0(ϑ, Z),W = wx0(ϑ, Z)) the intervention setting V to vx0(ν0, z0)
and W to wx0(ν0, z0) for any individuals in stratum {ϑ = ν0} ∩ {Z = z0},
for all ν0, z0. Arguing as before, it can be shown that IP(Y = 1|do(V =
vx0(ϑ, Z),W = wx0(ϑ, Z))) = IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0,W = wx0(ϑ, Z))). This
quantity generally differs from IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0) and the reason again
is that the intervention do(V = vx0(ϑ, Z),W = wx0(ϑ, Z)) not only ensures
that X = x0, but it also has a direct effect on Y through the intervention
on W .
4 Conclusion-Discussion
In this article, we showed how the hypothetical intervention do(X = x0),
when impossible to apply in practice, relates to interventions on causes of X .
Basing our arguments on structural causal models, our conclusions are in line
with those of Petersen12: the DAG which represents our assumptions on the
causal model under study is basically sufficient (and necessary) to precisely
understand how do(X = x0) can be interpreted. When interventions on
causes of X that are causes of Y through X only exist, the effect of do(X =
x0) captures the effect of such interventions. However, for causes of X , say
W , that cause Y not only through X , the effect of do(X = x0) only partly
captures the effect of interventions on W . Under simple causal models, the
effect of do(X = x0) is related to the indirect effect of interventions on W .
Taking the example of obesity (at 20 years old) and the risk of cancer (by
the age of 50), our results confirm concerns raised by several authors11,16,19:
because most modifiable causes of obesity can be regarded as confounders in
the obesity-cancer relationship, the effect of obesity estimated from obser-
vational data likely differs from the effect of interventions on these causes,
which could be estimated through clinical trials. At this point, however, we
may insist on the fact that, if all modifiable causes of obesity are confounders
in the obesity-cancer relationship, then clinical trials would not yield an esti-
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mate of the effect of obesity on cancer. Instead, a clinical trial would return
an estimate of the causal effect of the considered intervention on cancer,
and this effect would only partly capture the effect of obesity. Consider
again the clinical trial sketched in the Introduction. More precisely, consider
a randomized clinical trial where the study population, corresponding, e.g.
to lean teenagers, is randomly assigned to two arms. Denote by U and Z
the other, possibly non-modifiable, causes of X , with Z corresponding to
common causes of Y and X , and U corresponding to causes of Y through
X only. In this setting, observe that Y X=x ⊥6 W while Y X=x ⊥ (W,Z) in
general. Denote by U and Z the sets of possible values for U and Z, respec-
tively. Then, an “ideal” clinical trial would consist in randomly assigning
individuals to one of the following two groups: those for whom W would be
set to w1(U,Z) and those for whom W would be set to w0(U,Z), for two
given collections of values (w0(u, z))u∈U ,z∈Z and (w1(u, z))u∈U ,z∈Z , where
w0(u, z) and w1(u, z) ensure that X = 0 and X = 1, respectively, for indi-
viduals with U = u and Z = z. Assuming complete compliance, and arguing
as in Section 3, it is easy to show that the comparison of these two groups
would return an estimate of the effect of this particular intervention on W ,
not that of X . Comparisons should be made between groups of individuals
sharing the same value forW and Z to obtain a valid estimate of the effect of
obesity, within strata defined by W and Z. In other words, under this ideal
clinical trial setting, non-modifiable confounders in the X − Y relationship
would still have to be measured and controlled for to unbiasedly estimate the
causal effect of obesity, within strata defined by W and Z. When controlled
for a sufficient set of confounders, analyses based on observational studies
can be used to derive unbiased estimates of these same effects.
There are a number of subtleties that we neglected for the sake of sim-
plicity. First, a clinical trial whose objective is to prevent obesity by the
age of 20 would typically not only be dynamic, but also adaptive, i.e. the
intervention is not only subject-specific, but it is also time-dependent. A
good example is the Feeding Dynamic Intervention, to prevent childhood
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obesity (https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01515254). Similarly, al-
though we focused on time-fixed exposure and confounders, but they are
all time-varying in the population. For instance, physical activity and food
intakes vary over the age interval [0, 20), and the corresponding variables are
all potential confounders in the relationship between obesity at 20 years-old
and cancer occurence before 50 years-old. Another important time-varying
cause of obesity at 20 years-old is obesity over the age interval [0, 19). Con-
sequently, individuals in the two groups of our cohort, obese and lean at 20
years-old, do not only differ because of their status regarding obesity at 20
years of age, they also typically differ with respect to their histories regard-
ing obesity, physical activity and dietary habits. This can lead to biases if
these histories are not appropriately accounted for in the analysis21. Second,
selection bias may also be at play in our cohort study since only individuals
who are cancer-free at 20 can be included. This selection bias will be more
severe if cancer risk before 20 years old is associated to levels of obesity,
physical activity and dietary habits over the age interval [0, 19]. This selec-
tion bias due to prevalent exposure and depletion of susceptibles has been
put forward as one of the reasons explaining the discrepancies between re-
sults obtained through observational and interventional data when studying
the association between hormone replacement therapy and coronary heart
disease for instance22.
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A Proof in the unconfounded case
Under the model depicted in Figure 1a, we have
IP(Y = 1|do(U = ux0)) = IP(Y
(U=ux0 ) = 1)
= IP(fY (X
(U=ux0 ), ξ) = 1)
= IP(fY (x0, ξ) = 1)
= IP(Y (x0) = 1)
= IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0)).
B Proof in the confounded case
B.1 Interventions of type (i)
Assume that f−1
X|W (x0;w0) is non-empty for any x0, w0. Then, under the
model depicted in Figure 2a, we have, for any ux0(w0) ∈ f
−1
X|W (x0;w0)
IP(Y = 1|do(U = ux0(w0)),W = w0) = IP(Y
(U=ux0 (w0)) = 1|W = w0)
= IP(fY (X
(U=ux0 (w0)),W, ξ) = 1|W = w0)
= IP(fY (x0, w0, ξ) = 1)
= IP(Y (X=x0,W=w0) = 1)
= IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0,W = w0))
= IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0),W = w0),
where the last equality follows from rule 2 of the do-calculus3.
Moreover,
IP(Y = 1|do(U = ux0(W ))) =
∑
w0
IP(Y = 1|do(U = ux0(w0)),W = w0)IP(W = w0)
=
∑
w0
IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0),W = w0)IP(W = w0)
= IP(Y = 1|do(X = x0)).
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B.2 Interventions of type (ii)
Assume that f−1
X|U (x0;u0) is non-empty for any x0, u0. Then, under the
model depicted in Figure 2a, we have, for any wx0(u0) ∈ f
−1
X|U (x0;u0)
IP(Y = 1|do(W = wx0(u0)), U = u0) = IP(Y
(W=wx0(u0)) = 1|U = u0)
= IP(fY (X
(W=wx0(u0)), wx0(u0), ξ) = 1|U = u0)
= IP(fY (x0, wx0(u0), ξ) = 1|U = u0)
= IP(fY (x0, wx0(u0), ξ) = 1)
= IP(Y (X=x0,W=wx0(u0)) = 1).
B.3 Relationship with indirect effects
Denote by (w1(u0), w0(u0))u0∈U two given collection of values such that
w1(u0) ∈ f
−1
X|U (1;u0) and w0(u0) ∈ f
−1
X|U (0;u0). Further let do(W = w1(U))
and do(W = w0(U)) denote two given interventions setting W to w1(u0) ∈
f−1
X|U (1;u0) and w0(u0) ∈ f
−1
X|U (0;u0), respectively, for individuals in stratum
U = u0, for all u0 ∈ U . We have
IE(Y (w1(U)) − Y (w0(U))) =
∑
u
IE(Y (w1(u)) − Y (w0(u))|U = u)IP(U = u)
=
∑
u
IE(Y (w1(u),X
(w1(u))) − Y (w0(u),X
(w0(u)))|U = u)IP(U = u)
=
∑
u
{IE(Y (w1(u),X
(w1(u))) − Y (w1(u),X
(w0(u)))|U = u)
+ IE(Y (w1(u),X
(w0(u))) − Y (w0(u),X
(w0(u)))|U = u)}IP(U = u)
=
∑
u
IE(Y (w1(u),x1) − Y (w1(u),x0) + Y (w1(u),x0) − Y (w0(u),x0))IP(U = u).
The term
∑
u IE(Y
(w1(u),x1) − Y (w1(u),x0))IP(U = u) can be regarded as
an indirect effect since the level of W is held fixed and only the value of
X changes from x0 to x1 which, for individuals in stratum U = u, equal
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X(W=w0(u)) and X(W=w1(u)) respectively. More precisely, we have
∑
u
IE(Y (w1(u),x1) − Y (w1(u),x0))IP(U = u)
=
∑
u
{IE(Y |W = w1(u), X = x1)− IE(Y |W = w1(u), X = x0)}IP(U = u).
Under the model depicted in Figure 2a, recall we have
IE(Y |do(X = x1))− IE(Y |do(X = x0))
=
∑
w
{IE(Y |W = w,X = x1)− IE(Y |W = w,X = x0)}IP(W = w).
Under simple causal models, for instance when fY (W,X, ξ) = α
TW +
βX + ξ, the two quantities,
∑
u IE(Y
(w1(u),x1) − Y (w1(u),x0))IP(U = u)
and IE(Y |do(X = x1)) − IE(Y |do(X = x0)), coincide and equal β. How-
ever, under more complex models, these two quantities are typically differ-
ent. Even under linear models, if interaction terms of the form γTWX
are present in function fY , these two terms are typically different and∑
u IE(Y
(w1(u),x1) − Y (w1(u),x0))IP(U = u) would actually depend on the
collection of values {w1(u), u ∈ U}.
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